This paper provides a theoretical model for the coattail e¤ect, where a popular candidate for one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. I assume a political agency framework with moral hazard in order to analyze the coattail e¤ect in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is the outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians'e¤orts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an o¢ ce-motivated politician (executive or member of congress) prefers her counterpart to be a¢ liated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or to di¤erent parties. Two-sided coattail e¤ects then arise. On the one hand, an executive's success props up, while failure drags down, her partisan ally in the congressional election, which implies a presidential coattail e¤ect. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is a¤ected by a congress member's performance, which results in a reverse coattail e¤ect.
Introduction
The coattail e¤ect is de…ned as the tendency of a popular candidate for one level of government to attract votes to candidates from the same political party for other levels of government.
The presidential coattail e¤ect, where a congressional voting decision is a¤ected by an executive's performance, has been a topic of frequent study in the empirical literature (see Miller 1955 , Press 1958 , Kaplowitz 1971 , Calvert and Ferejohn 1983 , Campbell 1986 candidates for higher levels of government (Ames 1994 , Samuels 2000a , Samuels 2000b ). 1 While a number of studies have identi…ed and measured coattail e¤ects, "there remains a great deal of uncertainty concerning the causal mechanism responsible for these e¤ects." 2 Mondak and McCurley (1994) suggested that coattail e¤ects arise mainly owing to "voters' reliance on a speci…c cognitive e¢ ciency mechanism" and tested this claim empirically at the individual-voter level. 3 There is, however, no formal model of coattail voting, to the best of my knowledge.
In this paper, coattail e¤ects are explained within a retrospective voting model (i.e., a political agency model with moral hazard). In my framework, coattail voting arises as an outcome of the optimal implicit reward scheme that voters use to induce politicians'e¤orts.
I consider a representative voter who has to elect an executive and a member of congress in simultaneous elections. Politicians want to be reelected, and are held accountable for their performance at the moment of election. The politicians therefore have incentives to satisfy the voter's wishes. In addition, I assume that the politicians are loyal to their respective political parties: an executive prefers her partisan ally to win in the congressional election, and vice versa. 4 Hence, the incentives of the executive and the congress member are correlated. The 1 These publications provide evidence of reverse coattail e¤ects in Brazil. Broockman (2009) , however, found no evidence of reverse coattail e¤ects in congressional district-level data from the US presidential elections between 1952 and 2004. 2 Hogan (2005) , p. 587. 3 Mondak and McCurley (1994) , p. 151. 4 Several authors have made similar assumptions about politicians'partisan preferences. According to Fox and Van Weelden (2010), the legislature ("overseer") may seek to damage the reputation of an executive from another party while seeking to protect the reputation of an executive from his own party. Brollo and Nannicini (2010) assumed that an executive wants to maximize "the political capital represented by aligned mayors" by increasing the likelihood that a municipality is run by a mayor aligned with the central government. Fréchette et al. (2008) assumed that the party leader's objective is to maximize the reelection chances of the party's voter cares about the politicians' performance, which is observable but not contractible.
The voter evaluates the incumbents'performance and votes accordingly. More precisely, the voter employs implicit evaluation rules when deciding whether to reward (reelect) politicians.
Obviously, the voter can in ‡uence the politicians'behavior through the choice of evaluation rules. In this paper, the space of possible evaluation rules is restricted to linear functions of performance.
I show that given the correlation between the two politicians'incentives, the voter is better o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule (conditioned on the incumbents belonging to the same party or to di¤erent parties) rather than an individual-politician performance evaluation rule. In particular, the voter evaluates the performance of an executive and a congress member from the same party as a team. If the executive and congress member belong to di¤erent parties, then the voter compares their performances to create a competitive environment. This combination of coattail voting rules implies that improved performance increases a politician's own reelection probability, while increasing/decreasing the reelection probability of that politician's partisan ally/rival for the other o¢ ce. Politicians therefore have an extra incentive to perform better, for the sake of their party as well as for themselves.
In equilibrium, the reelection outcomes for incumbents from the same party are therefore positively correlated: the voter tends to reward/punish one incumbent for the good/poor performance of the other incumbent. Two-sided coattail e¤ects therefore arise. On the one hand, the executive's performance a¤ects the congress member's reelection, which gives rise to a presidential coattail e¤ect. On the other hand, the executive's reelection depends on the congress member's performance, which results in a reverse coattail e¤ect.
The equilibrium reelection outcomes for incumbents from di¤erent parties are negatively correlated: the voter is more likely to punish one incumbent the better the performance of the other incumbent. In particular, an executive's good performance drags down an incumbent congress member's reelection chances and therefore props up the executive's partisan ally in the congressional election, which implies a presidential coattail e¤ect. In turn, the congress member's success reduces the executive's reelection chances and thus promotes for presidential o¢ ce a candidate partisanly aligned with the congress member. As a result, a reverse coattail e¤ect arises.
These results rest on the assumption of politicians' partisan alignment; that is, it is assumed that executives and congress members prefer their partisan ally to win in the other incumbent politicians. In turn, Persico et al. (2007) modeled the hierarchy of party members as a "patronclient relationship," where a lower-tier politician (the "client") supports a higher-tier politician (the "patron") for promotion. election. Coattail voting rules then serve as an extra tool to discipline the politicians. If the assumption of partisan alignment is relaxed, this e¤ect vanishes and the voter no longer evaluates incumbents jointly. Instead, the voter uses a cuto¤ rule that each incumbent is reappointed only when her individual performance exceeds a critical threshold. There is then no coattail e¤ect.
I turn now to the fundamental question of why political process is modeled as political agency. In addition to a sound theoretical framework, this approach has received considerable empirical support (see, for example, Peltzman 1992 and Besley and Case 1995a , 1995b . Besley (2006) provided an excellent introduction to political agency models and "emphasizes the empirical potential of these models in explaining real world policy choices." 5 In a recent article in the New York Times, Glaeser pointed out that the "president ... is both our leader and our employee. We (the voters) chose him, our taxes pay his salary, and we can …re him in four years." 6 The political agency approach may therefore be appropriate for modeling political interactions between politicians and voters. Even so, elected politicians can only be o¤ered implicit incentive schemes; it is di¢ cult to reward public policies with explicit contracts.
The retrospective voting model used here goes back to Barro (1973) . Ferejohn (1986) extended the model and studied subgame perfect equilibria rather than Nash equilibria. Persson et al. (1997) used a retrospective voting approach to study rent extraction. In Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) , voters adopt retrospective voting strategies that are conditioned on the di¤erence between the incumbent's performance and her initial policy platform. Sundaram (1993, 1996) analyzed retrospective voting settings with both moral hazard and adverse selection, and with term limits. In turn, Kessing (2010) comparative performance evaluation between di¤erent local governments to create yardstick competition.
The vertical-competition literature, on the other hand, assumes that "senior and junior governments provide similar or comparable services, and that o¢ ce-holders in the government which is judged by citizens to be the more e¢ cient supplier will increase their probability of getting the vote of these citizens" 7 (Breton 1996 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out a model. Section 3 proceeds with the formal analysis. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Model
Consider a representative voter who has to elect an executive E and a congress member C in simultaneous elections. The politicians running for the two o¢ ces belong to one of two political parties. I assume that there is exactly one candidate from each party -the incumbent and an opponent -in each election. The opponents are identical to the incumbents in all respects except party label. There is no ideological heterogeneity in politicians'preferences. 8 The participation constraints of the politicians are always satis…ed.
While in o¢ ce, each politician i 2 fE; Cg has to implement a policy determined by her unobservable e¤ort a i . The set of e¤orts available to each politician is taken to be a nondegenerate interval [0; a] R. I assume that the performance of politician i, p i , is observed with an independent, unobservable noise " i :
7 Breton and Salmon (2001) , p. 139. 8 Since there is no ideological component, it is convenient to consider a single representative voter in this framework.
where " i N 0; 2 . 9,10,11
The reward of politician i is denoted by i (a i ). E¤ort is costly, and the standard convex cost function
2 is assumed here. 12 The executive and the congress member independently choose e¤ort levels a i to maximize their utility, which is given by
The function i (a i ) will be de…ned explicitly in Subsection 2.1.
The voter cares about the politicians'performances according to a linear utility function
I assume that the voter applies retrospective reappointment rules to reelect the incumbents,
i.e., the voter bases the reappointment decision on the politicians'performances p E and p C .
I denote the state variable by 2 fS; Dg. Here, = S corresponds to the case where the executive E and congress member C are members of the same party, and = D corresponds to the case where E and C are a¢ liated with di¤erent parties. 13 This is a sequential political agency game between politicians (the executive and the congress member) and a representative voter. The timing of events is as follows. First, the incumbents are drawn randomly, and a state 2 fS; Dg is realized. Second, the voter commits to the reappointment rules to be used in the coming elections. Third, the politicians 9 An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the two noise terms "E and "C are correlated and follow a bivariate normal distribution. I want to concentrate, however, on the case where the voter introduces joint performance evaluation owing to the correlation between politicians' incentives rather than the correlation between shocks. The latter topic has been widely studied in the context of team evaluation in contract theory (for an overview, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and in the literature on yardstick competition (see the references on yardstick competition in the Introduction). 1 0 One can assume that policy outcomes are determined by e¤ort and ability (rather than by e¤ort and noise). The results are qualitatively the same if politicians choose their e¤orts before knowing their abilities.
Otherwise, one has to solve an asymmetric information model. This extension is left for future research. 1 1 Alternatively, the voter might not be able to distinguish between the politicians' performances, and therefore would observe just their aggregate performance p = aE + aC + ". In that case the politicians would face a free-riding problem, as each of them contributes a costly e¤ort to an aggregate output. The analysis of this alternative framework is left for future research. 1 2 An extended version of the model is available upon request, where the cost of policy implementation for an executive and a congress member from the same party is di¤erent from that for politicians from rival parties (e.g., because of synergy). The results of this extended model are qualitatively the same. exert e¤orts a E and a C . Finally, nature chooses noises " E and " C , and the politicians'
performances p E and p C are observed. Both elections take place simultaneously and the voter applies the selected reappointment rules to reward or punish the incumbents. 14 The politicians' preferences are described in the following subsection. The paper then turns to the voter's problem and de…nes an equilibrium concept.
Politicians
The politicians' preferences are as follows. First, the executive E and congress member C want to be reelected. Moreover, E wants to improve her party's representation in the legislature. If C and E belong to the same party, then E prefers C to be reelected. Otherwise, E wants a new congress member (from her own party) to be elected for the next term.
Likewise, C wants to improve his party's chances of winning the presidential election. Thus,
C wants E to be reelected if the two are members of the same party, and wants the opponent to be appointed if E is from the rival party. The value of holding o¢ ce is normalized to 1.
The values which E and C associate with their parties'winning the other election are denoted by E and C , respectively. The probability of winning election i 2 fE; Cg is denoted by Pr i ( ). Therefore, politician i has the following reward function i : [0; a] 2 ! R, which depends continuously on both politicians'e¤orts:
where i; j 2 fE; Cg and j 6 = i. The preferences stated above re ‡ect the politicians'allegiance to their respective parties; individual politicians care about their party's overall representation in the executive and legislative branches of government, and not just their own reelection prospects. 15, 16 Still, it is a reasonable assumption here that a politician values her own o¢ ce more than her party's representation in the other o¢ ce, i.e., 0 i 1. 17 I call i the degree of politician i's loyalty to her party (or the strength of her partisan alignment). 18 
Representative Voter
The politicians'performances p E and p C (but not their composition between e¤ort and noise)
are observed but are not contractible. It is di¢ cult to reward public policies with explicit contracts. It is more natural to use implicit incentive contracting in this situation.
The voter observes the politicians'performances p E and p C , and in the elections rewards incumbents according to their performance; i.e., the voter reappoints incumbents who have shown "good" results. If an incumbent is thrown out of o¢ ce, an opponent from the rival party is elected.
Obviously, the voter can in ‡uence the politicians'behavior through the choice of evaluation rules. Intuitively, since politicians care about each other's reelection chances, the reward rules should allow joint performance evaluation. Under joint performance evaluation, the voter conditions politician i's reelection on her own performance p i (giving her an incentive to perform well, since she wants to be reelected) and on the performance p j of politician j (giving an incentive to politician j, since he cares about i's reelection chances).
The functional space of the performance evaluation rules is restricted to linear joint evaluation rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ). E and C are the slopes of the executive's and the congress member's performance evaluation rules, respectively, and b E and b C are the corresponding intercepts; E ; C ; b E ; b C 2 R, j E C j 1. 19 Under rules ( i ; b i ), i 2 fE; Cg, the probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce is
with i; j 2 fE; Cg and j 6 = i. Figure 1 depicts the possible outcomes for E and C under rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ) in the two-dimensional space of the observed performances p E and p C . Note that it is required that j E C j 1, so that the line a congress member with poor performance would be reelected, while politicians with better performance would not.
Note that under linear rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ), E is reelected when
In turn, C is reelected when
The two reelection outcomes are independent when E = 0 and C = 0, positively correlated when E > 0 and C > 0, and negatively correlated when E < 0 and C < 0. Throughout the rest of the paper, F will be used to denote the normal distribution function, and f for the corresponding density.
Equilibrium Concept
I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game backwards. First, I solve for the politicians'e¤orts a E and a C under rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ) in each state . Second, I examine the voter's choice of evaluation rules E ; b E and C ; b C for each state . Two de…nitions will now be introduced.
Given linear performance evaluation rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ), the equilibrium in e¤ort strategies is a pro…le of e¤orts a E ; a C such that
where i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j.
An equilibrium in rule strategies is de…ned as a tuple
where a E ( ) ; a C ( ) is an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies.
Intuition
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, some intuitive considerations will be discussed.
The incumbents care about each other's reelection chances, which provides the voter with an additional tool to discipline them. The voter then uses joint performance evaluation to increase the politicians'accountability. Intuitively, the voter rewards an incumbent from one Note that these coattail e¤ects arise because of the correlation of politicians'incentives such that each politician prefers her partisan ally to win the other election. Relaxing this assumption results in a prediction of no coattail e¤ects. Indeed, if politicians care just about their own reelection, the voter will reward them only for their own performance, so no coattail voting arises.
Analysis
In this section, the game is analyzed backwards to …nd a subgame perfect equilibrium. First, an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies is characterized, and then an equilibrium in rule strategies.
Equilibrium in E¤ort Strategies
The voter uses evaluation rules ( i ; b i ), i; j 2 fE; Cg. Under these rules, politician i's utility is i (a i ; a j ; )
Politician i chooses an e¤ort a i before observing a realization of the noise, and takes the voter's expectations as given. The proposition below establishes the existence of an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies. The continuity properties of the politicians' best response functions and Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem are used to obtain the result. Proofs of this and other propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1.
Under linear performance evaluation rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ) with j E C j 1, there exists an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies a E ; a C if the following second-order conditions are satis…ed: 8 > < > :
where i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j. This equilibrium is de…ned implicitly by 8 > < > : In this scenario, a politician does not want to damage her partisan ally's reelection prospects, and so exerts a lower e¤ort if = S. However, if = D, the politician has an extra incentive to work harder in order to reduce her partisan rival's reelection chances.
Note that in the case of positively correlated reelection outcomes there is a free-riding e¤ect between partisan allies ( = S). Intuitively, politician i might prefer to exert a lower e¤ort (and reduce the cost of that e¤ort) if her partisan ally j is performing well enough to improve i's reelection prospects. In fact, i "rides on the other incumbent's coattails".
Equilibrium in Rule Strategies
I turn now to the voter's choice of the evaluation rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ). Maximizing a E + a C with respect to E , b E , C and b C yields an equilibrium in rule strategies E ; b E ; C ; b C .
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.
There exists an equilibrium in rule strategies E ; b E ; C ; b C given by
where i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j. The politicians'equilibrium e¤orts a i in each state are equal to
It is important to point out that the second-order conditions (3.1) hold for E ; b E ; C ; b C .
The equilibrium in e¤ort strategies described in Subsection 3.1 is therefore well de…ned.
The voter is rational, and so realizes that the only alternative to reelecting incumbents is to vote for opponents from rival parties. The politicians' performances are additively separable in e¤ort and noise, and all politicians behave in the same way irrespective of the noise. If elected, an opponent i will exert an equilibrium e¤ort a i , which maximizes her expected utility. Thus, the voter compares the incumbents' performances with their opponents'expected performances and votes accordingly. That is why, in equilibrium,
According to Proposition 2, if politician j is loyal to his political party (i.e., j 6 = 0), the voter adopts a coattail voting rule to reelect politician i. The probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce under this rule is equal to
Intuitively, the incentives of an executive and a congress member are correlated, because they care about the overall representation of their party in both branches of government.
The voter therefore rewards politicians jointly rather than separately.
If the politicians belong to the same political party ( = S), then the voter uses a coattail voting rule under which the reelection of politician i is positively correlated with the performance of politician j ( i > 0). As a result, the voter evaluates the performance of politicians from the same party as a team and tends to reward incumbents from a well performing party and punish incumbents from a badly performing party. However, if the politicians belong to di¤erent parties ( = D), the voter uses a coattail voting rule under which the reelection of politician i is negatively correlated with the performance of politician j ( i < 0). As a result, the voter compares the performance of one politician with that of the other, creating a competitive environment between the parties. In this scenario, the voter tends to reward the incumbent from the better-performing party, while punishing the incumbent from the worse-performing party. In sum, owing to the correlation between the executive's and congress member's incentives such that they care about their party's chances of holding o¢ ce, the voter is better o¤ adopting party performance evaluation rather than individual performance evaluation.
This leads to two-sided coattail e¤ects. On the one hand, an executive's good performance props up, while poor performance drags down, a congress member candidate from the same party. A presidential coattail e¤ect then arises. On the other hand, the executive's own reelection depends on the congress member's performance, which gives rise to a reverse coattail e¤ect. Indeed, successful performance by a congress member advances the election of his partisan ally for executive o¢ ce, whereas a congress member's failures hinder it.
Note that the intensity of the coattail e¤ects depends on the strength of the politicians' partisan alignment. The more loyal the executive is to her political party (the higher E is), the more correlated the optimal reward scheme for the congress member is with the executive's performance (positively if = S or negatively if = D). The presidential coattail e¤ect therefore becomes more intense. Analogously, the greater the partisan alignment of the congress member (the higher C is), the more correlated the executive's reelection is with the congress member's performance. So the reverse coattail e¤ect becomes stronger.
If the politicians care equally about their own reelection chances and their party's election chances, then the best reward schemes are perfectly correlated: incumbents from the same party are always reelected or dismissed together. In the case of incumbents from di¤erent parties, reelection of one implies dismissal of the other.
The less loyal the politicians are to their political parties, the less correlated are their incentives. As a result, the voter adopts less correlated reelection rules in equilibrium, and the coattail e¤ects lessen. If politician j is not at all loyal to his political party ( j = 0), then the optimal rule for reappointing politician i is a simple cuto¤ rule: politician i is reappointed only if her observed performance exceeds a critical threshold given by the equilibrium e¤ort in this o¢ ce. That is, the probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce depends only on i's performance:
Intuitively, when politicians care only about their own reelection prospects, the voter is better o¤ rewarding politicians'individual performances rather than the party's performance.
So the coattail e¤ects vanish. Indeed, if an executive cares only about her own reelection ( E = 0), then her performance does not a¤ect a congress member's reelection chances, and the presidential coattail e¤ect disappears. In turn, the performance of a nonpartisan congress member ( C = 0) has no impact on an executive's reelection. So a reverse coattail e¤ect does not arise if the incumbent congress member cares only about his own reelection prospects.
How do the equilibrium e¤orts a i in (3.3) depend on the values of the parameters? First, a larger variance 2 of the noise decreases the politicians'e¤orts. Intuitively, more randomness in the observed performances p E and p C makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive to e¤ort, reducing the politicians' incentives. Second, if politician i's partisan alignment i is strengthened, the equilibrium e¤ort of politician i, a i , increases while that of politician j, a j , decreases. Intuitively, the more politician i cares about her ally's appointment to o¢ ce j, the more incentive she has to perform better. However, this weakens politician j's incentive to exert e¤ort, because his reelection becomes less sensitive to his own e¤ort. Note that partisan executive and congress member exert the same equilibrium e¤ort as politicians from di¤erent parties. The reason is that the politicians'preferences are symmetric between the states. The voter therefore adopts symmetric strategies, and the politicians exert the same equilibrium e¤ort regardless of the state.
Equilibrium Election Probabilities
In this subsection I calculate the equilibrium probabilities of election of partisanly aligned candidates and of election of candidates a¢ liated with di¤erent parties. The probability that candidates from the same party are elected in the state is denoted by P S , and the probability that candidates from di¤erent parties are elected in the state by P D . I establish the following result.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium probability of election of partisanly aligned candidates is
given by
where arctan ( ) is the arctangent function. The equilibrium probability of election of candidates a¢ liated with di¤erent parties is given by
Note that, independently of the incumbents'party labels, the election of partisanly aligned candidates is more likely than that of candidates a¢ liated with di¤erent political parties.
Indeed, the probability of election of candidates from di¤erent parties is never greater than
Intuitively, if the politicians belong to the same party ( = S), the voter adopts a coattail voting rule under which the incumbents' reelection outcomes are positively correlated: good performance by one incumbent tends to prop up, while poor performance drags down, her incumbent partisan ally in the other election. As a result, the incumbents are more likely to be reelected together or dismissed together than they are to receive opposite rewards. Thus, partisanly aligned candidates are more likely to be elected in both branches of government. If the incumbents are members of di¤erent parties ( = D), then the voter uses a coattail voting rule under which their reelection outcomes are negatively correlated: good performance by one incumbent increases, while poor performance decreases, the opponent's chances of winning in the other election. Thus, it is more likely that one incumbent will be dismissed while the other is reelected, and, again, partisanly aligned candidates are more likely to be elected in both branches of government. To con…rm this intuition, the politicians'reelection outcomes under equilibrium rules E and C in the two-dimensional space of performances p E and p C are depicted in Figure 3 . The density function of the joint distribution of p E and p C is symmetric around (a E ; a C ).
C . This probability takes its maximum value of 1 when E = C = 1, and its minimum value of 1 2 when E = C = 0. Intuitively, the more aligned politicians are with their parties, the more correlated (positively if = S or negatively if = D) the optimal performance evaluation rules are. The election of partisanly aligned candidates is more probable in both states, as explained above, so stronger party alignment just increases the probability of this outcome. Note, furthermore, that this probability does not vary between states, owing to the symmetry of the politicians'preferences (which in turn implies symmetry of the performance evaluation rules that the voter adopts in equilibrium).
Discussion
The results above show that coattail voting is in fact a tool that the voter uses to discipline partisan politicians. The model generates both presidential and reverse coattail e¤ects. Since lower-tier politicians prefer their partisan ally to take executive o¢ ce in the hope of receiving more generous transfers. On the other hand, an executive allocates more funds to districts governed by her partisan allies exactly because she wants lower-tier politicians to be aligned with the central government. And the executive wants this "either because local politicians are important opinion leaders and they may turn to be useful allies in the next presidential campaign, or because they may engage in rent-seeking activities for the President." 20 
Conclusion
This paper has studied coattail e¤ects in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. In a political agency model with moral hazard, coattail voting is an additional tool that voters use to motivate politicians'e¤orts.
The politicians'incentives are assumed to be correlated, as an executive/congress member prefers her counterpart (the congress member/executive) to be a¢ liated with the same political party. A representative voter is therefore better o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule rather than an individual performance evaluation rule when deciding whether to reward the incumbents. Under a joint rule, I have shown that the reelection outcomes for politicians from the same party will be positively correlated and the reelection outcomes for politicians from di¤erent parties will be negatively correlated. Two-sided coattail e¤ects therefore result. On the one hand, a presidential coattail e¤ect arises, as the executive's success/failure props up/drags down a candidate from the same party in the congressional election. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself depends on the congress member's performance, which implies a reverse coattail e¤ect.
I have focused on single-task policies. However, in reality, public policies pursue many goals. So it would be of interest to study coattail voting under the more realistic assumption of a multiple-task policy, where the problem of e¤ort allocation among tasks can create policy trade-o¤s. One can also add an adverse selection problem by assuming that a politician's performance is determined both by e¤ort and by her privately known ability. These tasks are left for future research.
Appendix

A. Proof of Proposition 1
Under linear performance evaluation rules ( i ; b i ), the probability of i being reelected to o¢ ce is
where the noises " i and " j (i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j) are independent normally distributed random variables, and so, by the convolution formula,
The …rst-order conditions with respect to the actual e¤ort a i , taking ( i ; b i ) and j ; b j as given, are 8 < :
The second-order conditions are 8 < :
(A.1)
I de…ne the best response functions by
The best response functions are then determined implicitly by the …rst-order conditions 8 > < > :
Since i (a i ; a j ; ) where i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j. Thus, a E ; a C is an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies if it satis…es the second-order conditions (A.1), which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
The voter chooses ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ) to maximize a E + a C = 8 > < > :
One can show that the values
maximize a E + a C in the state = S if 1 + j i 0 and maximize a E + a C in the state
0, i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j. This yields a E + a C = 8 > > > < > > > :
Maximizing a E + a C with respect to E and C yields the slopes of the equilibrium perfor- where a i = a i E ; b E ; C ; b C is the politicians' equilibrium e¤orts, which do not depend on the current state . The rest of the proof is straightforward.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The reelection of an incumbent i is determined by a random variable " i + i " j N 0; 1 + 2 i 2 , i; j 2 fE; Cg, i 6 = j. The density function of a bivariate normal distribution of random variables " E + E " C and " C + C " E , denoted by f " E + E " C ;" C + C " E (x; y), is f " E + E " C ;" C + C " E (x; y) = 1
In the state = S, partisanly aligned candidates are elected either when both incumbents are reappointed or when neither of them is reappointed (so, opponents from the rival party are elected). Denote by p i = a i + " i the performance of politician i in equilibrium. The equilibrium election probabilities in the state = S are given by P SS = P (fp E + C p C a E + C a C g \ fp C + E p E a C + E a E g) + P (fp E + C p C < a E + C a C g \ fp C + E p E < a C + E a E g) = P (f" E + C " C 0g \ f" C + E " E 0g) +
f " E + C " C ;" C + E " E (x; y) dxdy = In the state = D, candidates from di¤erent parties are elected when both incumbents are reappointed or when neither of them is reappointed. The equilibrium election probabilities in the state = D are given by
f " E C " C ;" C E " E (x; y) dxdy = 1 2 1 (arctan E + arctan C ) ;
where arctan ( ) is the arctangent function. Figure 1 : Executive E's and congressman C's reelection outcomes under linear rules ( E ; b E ) and ( C ; b C ) in the two-dimensional space of performances p E and p C . 
